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文號 第017/B/2023-DSB/AMCM號傳閱文件 文號年份 2023 官方來源 AMCM 指引頁 最近核實 2026-11-21
本指引目前僅有英文官方版本,以下為英文原文全文(由官方 PDF 提取)。中文參考譯本製作中,發布後將在此頁提供。如與官方原文有差異,以官方公布版本為準。

Circular No. 017/B/2023-DSB/AMCM

Date: 11/12/2023

Guideline on Technology and Cyber Risk Management

The Monetary Authority of Macao (AMCM), under the powers conferred by Article 9 of theCharter approved by Decree-Law No.14/96/M of 11th March and by Article 8 of Law no.13/2023 (Financial System Act, hereafter referred to as FSA), establishes the following:

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1.The technology and cyber risk landscape of the financial sector has beenrapidly transforming. Many financial institutions are embracingdigitalization to increase their operational efficiency and deliver betterservices to customers. While this is bringing significant benefits to thefinancial ecosystem, it is also increasing financial institutions’ exposure toa range of technology and cyber risks. These risks are increasing not onlybecause of the growing complexity of the underlying technologies beingused to support operation and financial services, but also because of theincreasingly sophisticated techniques being adopted by cyber threat actors.Financial institutions should therefore take proactive steps to understandtheir exposure to technology and cyber risks, and to put in place effectivecontrols to protect their organizations and customers.

1.2.This Guideline provides authorized institutions1 with a set of technologyand cyber risk management principles and best practices, designed tosupport authorized institutions in developing greater resilience totechnology and cyber risks. Since both the technologies adopted by thefinancial industry and the related cyber threats are evolving rapidly, therecommendations in this Guideline should not be considered as final ordefinitive. Apart from existing regulatory requirements and guidelines2,authorized institutions should always take into account the latest industrystandards and practices3 to ensure that their technology and cyber riskmanagement practices are adequate and consistent with the nature and scaleof their business.

1 Credit institutions and the institutions mentioned in this Guideline are collectively referred to as “authorizedinstitutions”.2 These include (but not limited to) the “Guideline on Risk Management of Electronic Banking”, the “Guidelineon Outsourcing”, the “Guideline on Business Continuity Management” and the Incident Reporting Measures forMajor Emergencies.3 Refer to Appendix B for references of industry standards and practices.

1.3.This Guideline sets forth the key principles for managing the risksassociated with cybersecurity and the adoption of technology. Allauthorized institutions are expected to adopt the key principles, which willassist them in establishing a sound and robust technology and cyber riskmanagement process. The Guideline is applicable to the following financialinstitutions authorized under the provisions of the FSA and specific lawsand regulations other than the FSA:

(a)credit institutions that are either locally incorporated or are branches ofoverseas banks in Macao;(b)financial companies;(c)cash remittance companies;(d)assets management companies;(e)investment fund management companies;(f) other financial institutions.

1.4.In this Guideline, the AMCM has taken into account the risk managementprinciples and sound practices found in similar technology and cyber riskmanagement standards, guidelines and frameworks being used by otherregulatory authorities as well as international standards4. Domains similarto those used in such standards, guidelines and frameworks have beenadopted here to organize related requirements. Authorized institutions areencouraged to familiarize themselves with the main principles of theseother documents.

2. RISK POSTED BY AND ASSOCIATED WITH TECHNOLOGY

4 For example:• “Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures” (June 2016), issued by the Committee onPayments and Market Infrastructures and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions(CPMI-IOSCO)• “Fundamental elements of cybersecurity for the financial sector” (October 2016), issued by the Group ofSeven (G7)• “Technology and Cyber Risk Management” (November 2021), issued by the Office of the Superintendent ofFinancial Institutions (OSFI)• “Cybersecurity assessment tool” (May 2017), issued by the United States Federal Financial InstitutionsExamination Council (FFIEC)• “Framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity” (April 2018), issued by the National Instituteof Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United States• “Cyber resilience oversight expectations for financial market infrastructures” (December 2018), issued by theEuropean Central Bank• “EBA Guidelines on ICT and security risk management” (November 2019), issued by the European BankingAuthority (EBA)

2.1.Technology and cyber risk refer to risks arising from the use of informationtechnology (IT) and the Internet. These risks include failures or breachesof IT systems, applications, platforms or infrastructure, which can result indata loss, financial loss, disruptions to financial services or operations, orreputational harm to an authorized institution.

2.2.As the use of technology for the provision of financial services and supportof operations becomes more prevalent, authorized institutions need tostrengthen their technology and cyber resilience to avoid operationaldisruptions and maintain public confidence in the institution and thefinancial system. The growing sophistication of cyber threats also demandsincreased vigilance on the authorized institutions, as well as strengthenedcapability to respond to emerging threats. Critical and essential financialservices should always be available to customers, and customer data shouldalways be adequately protected.

2.3.Inappropriate usage of authorized institutions’ information technologyresources may have significant risk implications. These could include, butnot limited to: (1) strategic risks resulting from poor decisions ontechnology-related investments; (2) operational risks caused byunauthorized access or disruptions to technology resources that supportmission-critical banking services; and (3) reputational and legal risksarising from material security breaches or the unavailability of computersystems needed to process customer information or transactions.

2.4.The board of directors is ultimately responsible for understanding the risksfaced by an authorized institution and ensuring they are properly managed;while the senior management is accountable for designing andimplementing a risk management system approved by the board. To thisend, the senior management should establish an effective technology andcyber risk management framework. This should normally include an ITgovernance structure, a continuously updated technology and cyber riskmanagement process, and implementation of sound practices in respect ofIT controls.

3. STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDELINE

3.1.This Guideline is divided into six domains. Each domain should beaddressed by an authorized institution as part of its technology and cyberrisk management process. The domains are summarized below, anddiscussed in more detail in Sections 4 to 11.

a) Technology and Cyber Risk Management Framework. Having aneffective technology and cyber risk management frameworkallows an authorized institution to better understand and manageits risk profile. Risk management involves identifying risks,assessing and monitoring risk exposures, and taking steps tomitigate the exposures with the necessary resources on an ongoingbasis. Once such a framework has been established, internalcontrols can be embedded into daily operations to manageexposures to technology and cyber risks effectively and efficiently.The requirements are further elaborated in Section 4.

b) Governance and Strategy. Sound governance, guided by a cleartechnology and cyber strategy, is an essential part of goodtechnology and cyber risk management. The governance processshould define an authorized institution’s technology and cyberresilience objectives, and set out the relevant requirements onpeople, processes and technology for achieving the objectives. Theboard5 and senior management should have clearly defined rolesand responsibilities, and there should be a good culture in placethat recognizes the importance of technology and cyber riskmanagement. The authorized institution should establish,implement and regularly enhance its governance approach tomanaging technology and cyber risks. These requirements arefurther elaborated in Section 5.

c) IT Project Management and System Development. Havingconsistent ITproject management practices allows an authorizedinstitution to monitor its projects effectively and to ensure thatoutcomes are aligned with its business objectives and are withinthe scope of its risk appetite. A System Development Life Cycle(SDLC) framework should be implemented to ensure the securedevelopment, acquisition and maintenance of IT systems that willperform as expected in support of the institution’s businessobjectives. Security practices should be embedded into the SDLCprocess to minimize system vulnerabilities and reduce the attacksurface. These requirements are further elaborated in Section 6.

5 In the case of branches of overseas incorporated banks, references to the “board of directors / the board” in thisGuideline refer to either the branches’ local management, or the management at the head office responsible forthe operations of the branches, depending on circumstances. In the case of a Macao incorporated bank, referencesto the “board of directors / the board” in this Guideline include any director or committee that is assigned to handlematters that require the board’s review / approval but arise between full board meetings.

d) IT Service Operations. Effective IT service operation controlsensure the stability of the IT production and backup environments.An authorized institution should establish proper governanceframeworks, policies, processes and procedures for its IT serviceoperations, with the aim of maintaining and improving theiroperations security, stability and efficiency in line with its businessneeds. These requirements are further elaborated in Section 7.

e) Cybersecurity. Strong cyber resilience is critical for maintainingpublic trust and confidence in financial services. Without effectivesecurity controls over systems and processes, the confidentiality,integrity and availability of data and systems could becompromised. An authorized institution should implementappropriate safeguards to ensure the uninterrupted delivery ofcritical services, and to contain the impact of any potentialcybersecurity event. These requirements are further elaborated inSection 8.

f) Response and Recovery. An authorized institution should be ableto operate on an ongoing basis, and to limit losses in the event ofsevere business disruption. It should therefore have plans forresponding to potential failure scenarios, including cybersecurityevents, as well as plans for ensuring the resilience and recovery ofany services impaired by disruptive events. These requirementsare further elaborated in Section 9.

4. TECHNOLOGY AND CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

4.1.Risk Management Framework4.1.1. Technology and cyber risk management framework. A technologyand cyber risk management framework should be established. Thisshould consist of a set of technology and cyber risk managementpolicies, procedures and controls, and should include clearlydefined roles, responsibilities and reporting lines. The frameworkshould articulate how the authorized institution determines itstechnology and cyber risk management objectives and risktolerance, and how its technology and cyber risk managementprocess supports its business objectives. This framework and anysubsequent modification to this framework should be approved bythe board.

4.1.2. Technology and cyber risk management embedded in enterpriserisk management. The objectives, policies, procedures and controlsthat constitute the technology and cyber risk managementframework should be aligned with the authorized institution’senterprise-wide risk management practices. The technology andcyber risk management framework should also be an integral partof its enterprise operational risk management framework.

4.1.3. Scope and availability. The technology and cyber risk managementframework should cover all processes and technology componentswithin the authorized institution. IT and business stakeholdersshould be engaged to ensure the practicality of the technology andcyber risk management framework and supporting policies acrossthe risk management processes. The framework should be clearlyand regularly communicated across the organization.

4.1.4. Review and Updates. The adequacy and effectiveness of thetechnology and cyber risk management framework and supportingpolicies should be reviewed and updated regularly, taking intoaccount the changing business and IT environments and theevolving cyber threat landscape.

4.2.Risk Management Process4.2.1. Technology and cyber risk management process. A formallydefined and documented technology and cyber risk managementprocess should be established that at a minimum encompasses riskidentification, risk assessment, risk mitigation, and risk monitoring,review and reporting.

a) Risk identification. Any threats and vulnerabilities applicable to theauthorized institution’s IT environment should be identified for allprocesses and assets supporting its business and operations,including assets that are maintained or supported by third partyservice providers and related parties.

b) Risk assessment. An assessment of the potential impact andconsequences of threats to and vulnerabilities of the overallbusiness and operations should be carried out. A set of criterion formeasuring and determining the likelihood and impact of the riskscenarios should be established, in order to prioritize the technologyand cyber risks faced.

c) Risk mitigation measures. Risk mitigation measures should beimplemented to align with the criticality of the authorizedinstitution’s IT assets and its risk tolerance level. If there areresidual risks that cannot be fully eliminated, re-assessment shouldbe carried out after measures have been put in place to ensure theserisks have been reduced to an acceptable level.

d) Monitoring, review and reporting. The authorized institutionshould establish a process for monitoring the operatingeffectiveness of IT controls against identified risks. A risk registershould be established and maintained by the authorized institutionto define the technology and cyber risks that it encounters. Anysignificant risks in the risk register should be closely monitored andreported to the board and the senior management, and the frequencyof the reporting should be commensurate with the level of risk. Arisk metric should be developed to quantify and report theexposures of significant technology and cyber risks.

5. GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGY

5.1.Board and Senior Management5.1.1. Board and Senior Management Responsibilities. The primaryresponsibility for technology and cyber risk management rests withthe board and senior management of an authorized institution. Theboard should establish and approve the authorized institution’stechnology and cyber risk appetite profile and tolerance bydefining the level of risk it is willing to assume. The board shouldalso ensure that senior management takes all necessary steps tomonitor and control risks. The board and senior managementshould have a good understanding of the authorized institution’s ITenvironment and latest cybersecurity threats, and should fullysupport and effectively maintain oversight over key technologyand cyber risk management initiatives and objectives. Hence,technology and cyber risk matters should be very visible at theboard level, and risk reporting (e.g. technology and cyber riskmetrics) should be made to the board regularly and immediately ifthere is any material change to risk register for the board discussionand to take appropriate action.

5.1.2. Ownership of the Technology and Cyber Risk ManagementFramework. Senior management with relevant and sufficientknowledge and experience should be given ownership of the

technology and cyber risk management framework and itssupporting policies which aligned with the framework. Thesepersonnel should also have the authority to consistently enforceimplementation of the framework and policies. Appropriategovernance structures and processes should be established, withwell-defined roles and responsibilities, and clear reporting linesacross organizational functions.

5.1.3. Technology and Cyber Risk Management Functions. At aminimum, the board and senior management should establish afunction (or a dedicated group) to support and implement thetechnology and cyber risk management process within theauthorized institution. This function or group should continuouslycarry out risk identification, risk assessment, and the tracking andmonitoring of risk mitigation measures.

5.2.Strategy5.2.1. Technology and Cyber Strategy. A technology and cyber strategyshould set goals and objectives that are measurable and evolve withchanges in the authorized institution’s IT and cyber environments.The strategy should be sufficiently detailed and include supportinginformation explaining the reasons for each major initiative. Thestrategy should take into account the potential risks associated withthe authorized institution’s short-term and long-term plans (e.g.new business initiatives, organizational changes, technologyadoption, cybersecurity planning, etc) and fits within theenterprise-wide risk management strategy. The strategy should bereviewed regularly by the board and senior management.

5.2.2. Risk Appetite and Risk Tolerance. The risk appetite and risktolerance levels for technology and cyber risks that the authorizedinstitution is willing and able to assume should be clearly defined,and this should be endorsed by the board and senior management.The risk appetite profile and tolerance levels should be regularlyreviewed.

5.3.Resources5.3.1. Budget and Resources Allocation. To support effectiveimplementation of technology and cyber risk managementmeasures, there should be a proper budget and resources allocationprocess (e.g. for areas such as staffing, cybersecurity tools, and

external expertise). The proper budgeting process should be ableto support regular and ad-hoc funding requirements.

5.3.2. Qualified Staffing. The authorized institution should ensure that allpersonnel with technology and cyber risk managementresponsibilities (whether board members, senior management orstaff) have adequate knowledge and/or experience. Staff holdingsuch responsibilities should also have relevant qualificationsand/or experience for performing their respective tasks.

5.4.Third Party Management65.4.1. Third Party Management Programme. A third party managementprogramme should be established with proper ownership andaccountability. The programme should cover, but not be limited to,third party risk assessment, third party selection process, and thirdparty evaluation. Responsibilities and processes for effectiveincident handling and disaster recovery should be established.

5.4.2. Risk Assessment. Third party risk should be included in theenterprise-wide risk agenda for discussion by senior management.Risk assessment should be performed on new vendors, and carriedout regularly on existing vendors, with a special focus oncybersecurity and data protection and privacy.

5.4.3. Contractual Agreements. The importance of technology and cyberrisk management (e.g. cybersecurity and data protection andprivacy) should be communicated to all third parties in formaldocuments. All third party contractual agreements should includestandard clauses concerning security requirements and annualreview requirements on third party vendors.

5.5.Audit and Compliance5.5.1. Independent Audit Function. To help the board and seniormanagement assess the adequacy and effectiveness of theauthorized institution’s technology and cyber risk managementframework, an independent audit function (or equivalent) withadequate qualifications and experience should perform relevantreviews and report the findings to the board and senior

6 When the third party falls into the scope of outsourcing, the authorized institution should also refer to the relevantregulatory requirements regarding outsourcing (see also the “Guideline on Outsourcing”).

management. Any issues identified, along with relevantremediation actions, should be properly tracked and reported.

5.5.2. Audit Approach. The technology and cyber risk audit plan shoulddocument a set of auditable areas, including IT processes,functions, and information systems. The frequency of assessmentof each of the auditable areas should be determined using a risk-based approach, with reference to system criticality andconfidentiality of information. The authorized institution’s auditapproach should be regularly reviewed in light of its latest inherentrisk profile and the changing cyber threat landscape.

5.6.IT Asset Management5.6.1. IT Asset Management Process. An IT asset management processshould be established. This should be a centralized and regularlyupdated asset inventory that identified critical assets, includinginterconnections with other internal and external systems. Theauthorized institution should also understand what businessfunctions and processes are supported by the IT assets. In addition,ownership of and responsibilities in managing the IT assets,including IT assets managed by third parties, should also be clearlydefined in the inventory.

5.6.2. IT Asset Inventory Checking. Regular checking of IT assets shouldbe conducted to identify any unregistered assets or unauthorizedchanges.

5.6.3. Information Asset Inventory. The authorized institution should atleast define the ownership of its critical information assets, whichinclude customer and internal data, hardware and software, andassign the respective roles and responsibilities for managing them.The owners should work with related functions (e.g. IT,compliance, audit etc.) to ensure appropriate security measures andcontrols are in place to protect critical data. An inventory ofinformation assets with proper classification and correspondingowners should be maintained and regularly reviewed.

5.7.Situational Awareness of Authorized Institutions5.7.1. Situational awareness and information sharing. The authorizedinstitution should maintain continuous situational awareness of thecyber threat landscape (e.g. emerging cyber threats againstfinancial services industry or organizations in Macau) that applies

to its IT and information assets. This could involve, for instance,participating in industry threat intelligence and information sharingforums and subscribing to timely and reputable threat informationsources for information on areas such as: emerging threats, attacktechniques, vulnerabilities and indicators of compromise. Cyberthreat intelligence sharing could also include sharing with relevantdomestic authorities. An authorized institution should timelyexchange threat intelligence to prevent cyber attacks, to enhanceits own technology and cyber resilience and that of the broaderfinancial sector.

5.8.Situational Awareness of Staff5.8.1. Situational awareness programme. A situational awarenessprogramme should be developed to enhance the security awarenessof the authorized institution’s staff members. The programmeshould be designed with different focuses for different targetgroups, including both new and existing staff. Apart fromincluding traditional security topics, the programme should alsoinclude topics such as newly developed technology and attacktactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) adopted by threat actors.The authorized institution should also consider requiring thirdparties that handle and/or process personal information or othersensitive data to complete such programme.

5.8.2. Effectiveness of the Programme. The effectiveness of theauthorized institution’s situational awareness programme shouldbe measured. Authorized institution should track to ensure all levelof staff, including the third parties, have completed the training.Apart from using traditional means to measure its effectiveness(e.g. training quizzes), simulated phishing emails or otherappropriate methods, could be used to test staff awareness.

5.8.3. Staff competence and training. The relevant technology and cyberrisk management functions of the authorized institution should beadequately staffed. These staff should undergo regular training toensure their knowledge and skill levels remain up to date in theface of emerging threats, trends, and technologies.

6. IT PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

6.1.IT Project Management

6.1.1. IT Project Management. IT related projects should be governed byan enterprise-wide project management framework approved bythe Board. The IT project management framework should set outthe standardized approach for managing projects that usedtechnology (e.g. roles and responsibilities, time and resourcesmanagement, quality assurance, etc.), and the necessary riskcontrols in managing technology and cyber risk throughout theproject lifecycle. Project performance and associated risks shouldbe measured, monitored, mitigated and periodically reported on anindividual and portfolio basis.

6.2.System Development Life Cycle6.2.1. System Development Life Cycle (SDLC). A formal SDLC processincorporating the principle of secure development should beestablished. This should include specific checkpoints to assesssecurity risks and identify mitigation strategies in different phasesof the SDLC, including systems analysis and requirementdefinitions, system design, development, integration and testing,acceptance, installation, development, maintenance, evaluation,and disposal.

6.2.2. Secure Coding Practice. Secure coding practices should beestablished that are in line with industry standards. In developingand updating coding practices, vulnerabilities identified by vendors,security tools, penetration testing and vulnerability assessmentshould be taken into account.

6.2.3. Secure Development Environment. The authorized institutionshould consider setting up a development environment that hassecurity controls similar to those of its production environment.

6.2.4. Change Management. Change management processes should beintegrated with baseline configuration standards, such that anytechnology changes may trigger update of such standards. Systemchange and update should be validated before applied toproduction.

a) In the system development process, secure configuration andrisks associated with the technology components should beconsidered and assessed against different cyber threatscenarios. Third-party components should be evaluated for

stability, security and overall risk before they areimplemented.b) During the testing phase, relevant security testing (such aspenetration testing, source code review, and vulnerabilityassessment) should be performed before any system andcomponent is implemented in the production environment.

6.2.5. Secure Development by Third Parties. Reviews should beperformed on the security impact of systems and componentsdeveloped by third parties, just as for systems developed in-house.Authorized institutions should also maintain a list of the thirdparties service providers and consider implementing relevantsecurity controls as recommended in the Third Party Managementin Section 5.4. The authorized institution could consider includingin the contracts an escrow agreement with the third parties forcritical systems, specifying circumstances which would allow itaccess to the source code of the systems, so as to minimize servicedisruption when the third parties were unable to provide supportand services.

6.3.Software Security6.3.1. Software Acquisition. Software should be evaluated for securityrisks before acquisition, and relevant security testing (such aspenetration testing and vulnerability assessment) performed priorto its implementation.

6.3.2. Continuous Monitoring and Improvement. Controls should beimplemented to prevent unauthorized changes to software. Thesoftware should be continuously tracked for security updates. Inthe case of end-of-support or end-of-life software, the securityimpact of its ongoing use should be regularly assessed.

7. IT SERVICE OPERATIONS

7.1.Access Control7.1.1. Policies for Access Control. Formal policies for access controlshould be established. The policies should cover user accountmanagement, privileged account management, monitoring,account review, remote and physical access management.

7.1.2. User Account Management. Physical and logical access to a systemand device should be restricted to authorized individuals. Reliable

controls should be implemented to restrict system access, such asrole-based access, segregation of duties and strong authentication(e.g. multi-factor authentication). The authorized institution shouldconsider adopting the automatic provisioning and de-provisioningof user access based on user access changes required. For changestriggered by employment termination or resignation, it shouldconsider adopting automated de-provisioning, driven by its system(for instance, the Human Resource system).

7.1.3. Privileged Account Management. Strong controls should beimplemented over privileged system access by strictly limiting andclosely supervising all staff having elevated system accessentitlement. All privileged accounts and shared accounts should becentrally managed, and their passwords should be managed usinga password vault solution that automatically changes passwordsafter checkout. Multi-factor authentication should be adopted forprivileged access to critical systems and for access to sensitive orconfidential data.

7.1.4. Monitoring of User Accounts and Privileged Accounts. Useraccounts and privileged accounts should be monitored forunauthorized access. An authorized institution should considerincorporating such monitoring into an enterprise-wide securitymonitoring solution with security event correlation and alertingcapabilities.

7.1.5. Access Reviews. Reviews should be regularly conducted to identifyany excessive privileges and obsolete accounts to preventunauthorized access.

7.1.6. Physical Access Management. Physical access controls should beimplemented to prevent unauthorized access to organizationalassets. Access control mechanisms should be used to monitor entryor exit points. Physical protection mechanisms should be protectedfrom tampering and actively monitored. Sensitive areas shouldhave additional locks or alarms.

7.1.7. Remote Access Management. Remote access refers to usersconnecting to the authorized institution's internal network viaexternal or internet access. In such cases, strong authentication,such as multi-factor authentication should be enforced to preventunauthorized access. Secure encryption should also be adopted to

protect the remote access session against network sniffing andeavesdropping.

7.2.Patch Management7.2.1. Patch Management Process. A patch management process shouldbe formally defined and documented, and should incorporatechange management controls. Testing, and risk and vulnerabilitymitigation evaluation should be performed throughout the process.The process should be reviewed regularly to ensure compliance.

7.2.2. Patch Checking. Exceptions on configuration and patch handlingshould be identified, for instance by regularly using scanning toolsor automated tools. Exceptions should be mitigated or resolved ina timely manner or within a defined timeframe.

7.2.3. Remediation. Requirements for patch management should bemaintained and regularly updated. Timeframes should be set forpatches with different levels of criticality. Remediation plansshould be developed for non-compliance, to be tracked andmonitored for completion by defined deadlines.

7.3.Configuration Management7.3.1. Baseline Configuration. A baseline system configuration should beestablished and enforced, and regular reviews be performed in thelight of industry standards and cyber threat levels.

7.3.2. Configuration Change. Any change to the configuration shouldfollow the change management process, and include propercontrols and monitoring. An authorized institution should considerimplementing a technical solution to prevent unauthorized changesto the configuration of its critical systems.

7.4.Mobile Devices Management7.4.1. Mobile Devices Management. Relevant security controls should beestablished over the use of mobile devices (both corporate andpersonal devices). Before allowing a mobile device access to theauthorized institution’s internal network or systems, measures suchas integrity scanning, mobile device management (MDM) solution,remote software version/patch validation, or other appropriate

methods should be implemented to ensure the mobile device issecure and has not been jailbroken, rooted or compromised.

7.4.2. Wiping of Mobile Devices. Controls should be implementedallowing mobile devices to be wiped remotely if they go missingor are stolen.

7.5.Physical and Environmental Protection7.5.1. Protection should be in place against damage and interference tothe authorized institution’s data centres or other informationprocessing facilities. In particular, protection and monitoringcontrols should be implemented to protect against natural disasters,malicious attacks, and accidents.

8. CYBERSECURITY

8.1.Network Security8.1.1. Policies and Processes. Policies and processes for networksecurity should be established, covering areas such as networkaccess management, network protection, configurationmanagement, and vulnerability management.

8.1.2. Network Access Management. Proper network access controlsshould be implemented, and strong authentication adopted forcritical network assets. Network activities should be properlylogged and monitored. All incoming and outgoing third-partyconnections, and their related trust levels, should be properlydefined, documented and regularly reviewed. Remote access toadministrative systems should be restricted. Controls should alsobe implemented to prevent unpatched and unauthorized devicesfrom connecting to the network.

8.1.3. Network Protection. Networks should be properly protected andsegmented. The internal network should be segregated intodifferent trust / security zones to protect against attacks, andnetwork perimeter defence tools (e.g. border routers and firewalls)should be used. An intrusion detection system (IDS) and anintrusion prevention system (IPS) should be adopted and properlyconfigured to detect and block potential intrusions. Solutionsshould be implemented to effectively prevent and mitigate

disruptive cyber attacks (e.g. denial-of-service attacks). Wirelessnetworks should be strongly protected with proper encryption andsegmentation.

8.1.4. Configuration Management. All changes to the networkinfrastructure (including system configurations) should follow adocumented end-to-end change management process with propertesting and approvals. This process should evaluate whether theproposed changes might affect operational activities or introducesecurity risks. Firewall rules should be adequately configured andpreferably administered centrally. Administrative access to thenetwork should be properly confined and monitored to preventunauthorized changes.

8.1.5. Vulnerability Management. Periodic scans of the network forsecurity vulnerabilities should be performed. Network devicesshould be regularly patched and kept up to date.

8.1.6. Network Architecture. Full details of the network architectureshould be documented, and regularly updated.

8.1.7. Anti-virus / Anti-malware Tools. Anti-virus and anti-malware toolsshould be adopted with up-to-date definitions.

8.2.Data Security8.2.1. Data Protection Programme. A data protection programme shouldbe established to protect sensitive data at rest, in transit and in use.The programme should be reviewed regularly in the light ofinternal or external assessments and audits. Access to sensitive datashould be logged, and actively monitored for appropriateness.Sensitive data should be encrypted at rest and in transit if it istransmitted across public or untrusted networks. In addition,encryption or other data protection measures should be adopted orimplemented when sensitive data is transmitted across privateconnections and within the institution's trusted zones.

8.2.2. Data Inventories and Data Flows. Data inventories should includestructured and unstructured repositories of data. Data architectureand sensitive data flows should be documented, and thisinformation should be used to ensure that the data protectionprogramme provides adequate coverage for both the authorizedinstitution and third parties.

8.2.3. Data Classification. A formal policy should be established forhandling data based on its classification. Appropriate personnel(e.g. data owner and compliance team) should review the dataclassification regularly.

8.2.4. Data Transfer. Data transfer guidelines should be established thatprovide clear guidance on security practices for data transfer.Measures should be in place to identify and remediate insecure datatransfers.

8.2.5. Data Protection Tools. Data Loss Prevention solutions and similartools should be considered to detect and block unauthorizedtransmission of sensitive data.

8.2.6. Cryptography. Well established international standards should beadopted when selecting encryption algorithm and encryption keylength to protect sensitive data. Moreover, the authorizedinstitution should regularly review and update its algorithms and/orincrease the key lengths to ensure they remain resilient againstevolving cyber threats.

8.2.7. Data Disposal and Destruction. Secure processes should beestablished for disposing of and destroying sensitive data.Sensitive data should be irrevocably deleted from devices, storagemedia or systems before such are being disposed.

8.3.Detection and Monitoring8.3.1. Security Monitoring Processes. Security monitoring processes andprocedures should be formally defined and documented, andconsistently followed. Documentation should be reviewed,updated and properly approved to reflect any changes in processesor procedures.

8.3.2. Logging. An authorized institution should have a loggingmechanism that provides good security monitoring and logprotection. Logging should be implemented for securitymonitoring and detection of anomalous activities. Loggingpractices should be formally defined and documented, andregularly reviewed. These practices should include, but not limit to,log types for recording, retention periods, disposal methods, logmasking requirements, and frequency of log collection and review.

8.3.3. Monitoring. A risk-based approach to monitoring should beadopted that covers multiple components (e.g. monitoring of high-risk networks, hosts, privileged access, file levels, etc.).Monitoring should take the form of automated alerts (e.g. emails,text messages) sent to designated response personnel for pre-defined events (e.g. high risk events with a low likelihood of falsepositives). These alerts should be properly monitored and reviewed.Security monitoring reports should be regularly sent tomanagement and other personnel as required.

8.3.4. Security Information and Event Management. Processes and toolsshould be adopted for effective security monitoring. An authorizedinstitution should consider adopting tools that consolidate logsfrom different sources (such as application logs, access logs, logsfrom network devices, sensitive data and intelligence feeds fromthird-party sources, and vulnerability assessment results) toperform correlation analysis and identify potential security threats.A user behavioural-based detection mechanism should be set up todetect malicious user or network activities, and emerging threatswith predefined monitoring rules. Threat intelligence andindicators of compromise should also be taken into account whenenhancing security monitoring. Detection capabilities should alsobe established for simultaneous attacks. Intelligence feeds shouldbe regularly updated.

8.3.5. Security Monitoring Team. A qualified team (e.g. the SecurityOperation Centre team) should be dedicated to monitor securityevents. The roles and responsibilities of the security monitoringteam members should be formally documented and clearlycommunicated.

8.4.TestingProgramme and Methodologies8.4.1. A testing programme should be established to validate theeffectiveness of the authorized institution’s technology and cyberrisk management on a regular basis. The latest cyber threatintelligence should be employed when designing or updating thetesting programme. When designing or updating the programme,key stakeholders (e.g. board and senior management and relevantbusiness line management) and external stakeholders such ascritical third-party should be involved. The conditions fortriggering testing, and the frequency of testing should be identified.

The authorized institution should also establish a set of measuresto avoid testing having any impact on its production systems. Thetesting programme should contribute to ongoing improvements tothe institution’s technology and cyber risk management.

8.4.2. Vulnerability Assessment. Vulnerability assessments should beregularly performed to identify and assess any system securityvulnerabilities. The frequency of the vulnerability assessmentshould be commensurate with the criticality of the IT system andthe security risk it is exposed to. Processes should be establishedto prioritize and remediate issues identified in vulnerabilityassessments, and to validate the remediation.

8.4.3. Penetration Testing. Authorized institutions should performpenetration testing on their assets such as applications,infrastructure, internal and external network, and endpoint devices,which should simulate actual attack scenario on the systems, toidentify vulnerabilities in business processes and technical controls.The frequency of the penetration testing should be commensuratewith the criticality of the IT system and the security risk it isexposed to. The testing should be performed on the assets beforethey are placed into production and after major changes to theassets. The scope of the testing on existing assets should becompared against an established asset inventory to ensure coverage.Apart from the white-box penetration testing approach, othertesting approaches such as black-box and grey-box style7 testingcan also be considered. Results of the penetration testing should beused to enhance the system development as part of the securecoding practice and cybersecurity management.

8.4.4. Threat Intelligence-Based Attack Simulation. Authorizedinstitutions should utilize threat intelligence analysis to createtailored, end-to-end cyber attack testing scenarios that are specificto both their own operations and the broader financial sector. Thesesimulation tests should be carried out in a production environmentto mimic real-life attack scenarios. Their purpose is to validate theeffectiveness of existing security controls in protecting againstreal-world threats. Such simulation testing should be conducted ina controlled manner under close supervision to ensure that

7 White-box, black-box and grey-box testing: White-box Testing - A test methodology that assumes explicit andsubstantial knowledge of the internal structure and implementation detail of the assessment object. Black-boxTesting – It is in contrast to the white-box testing, in which the tester has no knowledge at all. Grey-box Testing– It is a test methodology in between white-box and black-box, in which the tester has some knowledge of theassessment object.

production systems are not impacted. If the potential impact oncertain components within the production environment is deemedunacceptable, the authorized institution may consider conductingtests on a simulated component that closely resembles theproduction component. The simulation testing should be conductedin several phases, which include but are not limited to:

a) Scoping the critical functions mapped to key systems;b) Leveraging threat intelligence to identify potential threat actorsand the tactics, techniques, and procedures likely to be used inattacks on critical functions and target systems;c) developing testing scenarios based on insights gained fromthreat intelligence;d) conducting stealthy, intelligence-led tests against the criticalfunctions and target systems; ande) preparing relevant documentation to record the outcomes ofthe simulation testing.

The results of these tests should be reported to both the board andsenior management, and effective risk mitigation controls shouldbe applied to address any identified control gaps. The frequency ofthe simulation testing should be commensurate with the cyber riskprofiles of the authorized institutions or should be performed uponnotification from the AMCM.

8.4.5. Scenario-based Testing. Scenario-based testing, such as incidentresponse testing should be conducted to test the ability of staff andprocesses to respond to different scenarios in order to achievestronger operational resilience.

8.5.Remediation Management Process. A formal remediation managementprocess should be in place for handling vulnerabilities identified from thetesting described in Section 8.4. A mechanism should also be set up tocentrally track the remediation of vulnerabilities through their lifecycle.Ownership of vulnerability remediation should be assigned and properlyrecorded. All remediated vulnerabilities should be reassessed before theyare treated as closed. The remediation status should be reported regularlyto senior management.

8.6.Qualified Testers. All testing should be conducted by testers with adequateknowledge, experience and qualifications8. These testers should be

8 Refer to Appendix A for an example of professional cybersecurity qualifications for intelligence-driven testing.

independent from the parties that design, implement or operate the controls,and should be able to report their findings freely and directly to the boardand senior management.

9. RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

9.1.Business Continuity Planning 99.1.1. Business Continuity Management Programme. A BusinessContinuity Management Programme should be set up, with acommittee consisting of senior management and relevantstakeholders from business and IT having ownership of andresponsibility for the programme. Roles and responsibilities shouldbe fully established and endorsed by the committee. The BusinessContinuity Plan should be reviewed and updated at least annually.The Business Continuity Management Programme framework andpolicy should be operationalized across the authorized institution.

9.1.2. Business Impact Analysis. Business impact analysis, riskassessments and gap analysis should be conducted to keep theBusiness Continuity Management Programme up to date. Abusiness impact analysis should be used to prioritize the recoveryof services. A gap analysis should be conducted to identify anydiscrepancies between the Recovery Time Objective (RTO), theRecovery Point Objective (RPO), and the existing recoverycapabilities. Key findings, and threats and vulnerabilities identifiedby the gap analysis should be reviewed and approved by the seniormanagement.

9.1.3. Crisis Management Plan. A formal Crisis Management Planshould be developed for handling disruptive and unexpected cyberevents, with clear roles and responsibilities assigned. Crisisescalation and incident management protocols should beestablished and consistently followed. The Crisis ManagementPlan should be reviewed and updated at least annually in line withemerging cyber threats.

9.1.4. Disaster Recovery Plan. A Disaster Recovery Plan should beestablished so that the authorized institution can recover its ITfunctions following a disaster. The plan should clearly document

9 Refer also to the relevant requirements regarding Business Continuity Management (e.g. “Guideline on BusinessContinuity Management”).

the recovery procedures and the capabilities required to recoverinformation systems or technology components in differentadverse scenarios. Testing is important for identifyingimprovements in the Disaster Recovery Plan and for familiarizingstakeholders with the plan. A disaster recovery drill should beintegrated and functional in nature, in which business, IT and third-party service providers all participate. The Disaster Recovery Planshould be reviewed and updated at least annually, based on the drillresults.

9.1.5. Resources Management. Teams responsible for businesscontinuity and disaster recovery should be set up, trained and givenclear roles. A budget should be planned and allocated at leastannually, in alignment with the planned Business ContinuityManagement initiatives as approved by the respective committee.

9.2.Incident Management9.2.1. Incident Management Programme. An incident managementprogramme should be maintained, to provide visibility of incidentsto the board and senior management, and to engage their ongoingoversight and support. The programme should cover areas such asincident identification, reporting, classification, handling,notification and recording.

9.2.2. Incident Management Procedures. A formal chain of custodyprocedures (including forms, log, procedures, etc.) should bedefined, documented and communicated to all members of theincident response (“IR”) team as well as other relevant internal andexternal stakeholders (e.g. staff, contractors, vendors, suppliers,etc.). Decision criteria should be fully defined and documented,and applied consistently throughout the incident triage process.Additional procedures for facilitating forensic investigations (e.g.digital evidence handling) should also be considered to support theincident response.

9.2.3. Incident Classification Matrix. An incident classification matrixshould be established so that incidents can be clearly classified inorder for the correct handling and reporting procedures to beapplied. Different scenarios should be taken into consideration inthe design of the incident classification matrix.

9.2.4. Incident Communication and Reporting Requirements. Incidentcommunication and reporting requirements should cover bothinternal and external parties. External reporting requirements (suchas those in response to regulatory or legal requirements) should beidentified, documented and communicated to all responsibleparties. Regulatory reporting requirements should also be reviewedby subject matter experts (e.g., compliance, legal, etc.) to ensurethey are accurately understood. Specific procedures should bedefined and updated to ensure compliance and avoid errors ordelays.

9.2.5. Reporting to AMCM. Incidents should be reported according to therequirements of “Incident Reporting Measures for MajorEmergencies”.

9.2.6. Reporting to Cybersecurity Incident Alert and Response Centre(CARIC). In addition to reporting to AMCM, any technology andcyber security related incident should also be reported to CARICaccording to the requirements of “Regulação de alerta, resposta ecomunicação de incidentes da cibersegurança” (《網絡安全——事故預警、應對及通報規範》).

9.2.7. Testing. Regular testing of the authorized institution’s incidentresponse plan should take place. If significant change is made tothe incident response plan, testing should be performed to ensurethat the change does not affect business availability and theinstitution can still meet its business needs. The authorizedinstitution should consider involving critical third parties in thetesting. The results of the testing should be used to improve theincident response plan.

9.2.8. Incident Management Team and Resources. A cross-functional IRteam should be assembled with the right skills and expertise tohandle incidents falling within the scope of the incidentmanagement programme. The team should have relationships withfunctional authorities and industry groups that can be leveraged asneeded. The board of the authorized institution should take finalaccountability for all incidents. Roles and responsibilities shouldbe reviewed regularly, with capability gaps being identified andfilled.

9.2.9. Up-to-date Incident Management Programme. The authorizedinstitution’s incident management programme should be kept up-to-date and responsive to emerging threats and technologies.Recent cases of cyber incidents and attacks could be used tocontinuously improve the programme and update the supportingcomponents, such as testing scenarios and resource arrangements.

9.2.10. Incident Response. Incident response processes should involveother parts of the authorized institution (e.g., the CrisisManagement team) to ensure timely remediation and clearcommunication with internal and external stakeholders.

9.2.11. Problem Management. An authorized institution should establisha problem management process to ensure that it can determine andresolve the root causes of incidents, and take necessary measuresto prevent their recurrence. Records of past incidents shouldinclude lessons learnt, to facilitate the diagnosis and resolution offuture incidents with similar root causes. Additional analysisshould be conducted on past incidents to verify that the root causesto the problems have been properly addressed.

10.EMERGING TECHNOLOGY

10.1. Emerging Technology Management Principle10.1.1. Emerging Technology Management Principle. Many authorizedinstitutions are adopting emerging technologies (e.g. Internet ofThings (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), and cloud computingtechnology 10 ) to enhance their business and operationalcapabilities. However, the growing adoption of emergingtechnologies also introduces new risk management challenges. Theboard and senior management of an authorized institution shouldensure that a proper governance framework and risk managementmeasures are in place to oversee and manage the adoption ofemerging technologies. The roles and responsibilities in managingthe risks of emerging technologies should also be clearly definedin the governance framework.

10.2. Internet of Things

10 Reference should also be made to the relevant requirements regarding the adoption of cloud computingtechnology (e.g. the “Guideline on Outsourcing” and the “Industry Guidance on Cloud Outsourcing Controls”).

10.2.1. Internet of Things. The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to anyelectronic devices, including but not limited to multi-functionprinters, security cameras and smart televisions, that can beconnected to the authorized institution's network or the Internet.The authorized institution should maintain an inventory of all itsIoT devices. This should record both their locations on the networkand their physical locations. As most IoT devices are designed withminimal security controls, it is important for authorized institutionsto assess the function and criticality of the data that is collected,stored and processed by the IoT devices, and implementappropriate security measures. For instance, network accesscontrols should be considered to restrict network traffic to and fromIoT devices and prevent malware attacks. To further mitigate theIoT risks, authorized institutions should host IoT devices on aseparate network segment from the network hosts the authorizedinstitution's critical systems and sensitive data to reduce IoT risks.Moreover, authorized institutions should monitor their IoT devicesfor suspicious or anomalous system and network activities, andisolate the compromised devices if any malicious activity isdetected.

10.3. Artificial Intelligence10.3.1. Governance of Artificial Intelligence. A proper ArtificialIntelligence governance framework, as well as technology andcyber risk management measures should be put in place to monitorthe use of AI applications. Roles and responsibilities formonitoring the operations of AI applications should be defined inthe framework. Before any AI application is adopted, itstechnology and cyber risk should be assessed by the authorizedinstitution.

10.3.2. Logging of AI applications. As “black box” model is commonlyadopted by AI during the computing process, an authorizedinstitution should ensure that sufficient audit logs and otherrelevant documents are generated by AI applications to enableproper investigation in the case of unfavourable incidents oroutcomes. The audit logs and documentation should be retainedaccording to the relevant regulatory requirements.

10.3.3. Data security of AI application. Each AI application’s usage ofsensitive data or personal identifiable information should beassessed. If sensitive or personal identifiable information is used,

data protection measures should be implemented in the AIapplication to protect such information in accordance withapplicable local and overseas regulatory requirements.

10.3.4. Cybersecurity measures. As the adoption of AI applications mayintroduce new cybersecurity threats to an authorized institution,such as data poisoning and adversarial attacks, which exploit AImodels through data manipulation. Authorized institution shouldreview the AI computing process and the effectiveness of itssecurity controls periodically to mitigate the risk with such threats.

10.3.5. Contingency measures. In addition to the security measuresoutlined above, an authorized institution should create acontingency plan that will promptly suspend the application if itgenerates unintended outcomes, and trigger fallback procedures.

10.4. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)10.4.1. Distributed Ledger Technology. Distributed ledger (e.g.,blockchain) technology refers to the protocols and infrastructurethat allow computers in different locations to propose, validate, andrecord transactions in a synchronized manner across a network.Authorized institutions should thoroughly understand the use casesand identify and assess the potential risks and implications beforeadopting distributed ledger technology. Authorized institutionsshould also refer to the governance framework, internationalstandards, guidelines, circulars and white papers developed byother regulatory authorities in order to stay updated on bestpractices for managing the specific risks associated with thistechnology.

11.INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

11.1. Independent Assessment of Technology and Cyber Risk Management

11.1.1. Independent Assessment. An independent assessment of anauthorized institution’s technology and cyber risk management(which should, at a minimum, cover paragraphs 4 to 10 of thisGuideline) should be performed at least every two years or uponnotification from AMCM. Those performing the independentassessment should have, and be able to demonstrate, the necessary

expertise11 in the relevant fields. They should be independent fromthe parties that develop or administer the system, and not involvedin the operations to be reviewed or in selecting or implementingthe relevant control measures to be reviewed. They should be ableto report findings freely and directly to the authorized institution’sboard and senior management. If meeting the above criteria, theassessors can be internal staff (e.g. internal auditors) or an externalparty (e.g. an external auditor or another third-party serviceprovider). The results should be approved by senior managementand the report should be submitted to AMCM. It should include atleast the following items:

a) time of assessment;b) scope and approach adopted;c) the assessors’ findings and recommendations; andd) management responses.

11.2. Reference to Industry Standards and Practices

11.2.1. An authorized institution should consider referring to differentindustry standards and practices to provide itself with a benchmarkfor evaluating and enhancing its technology and cyber riskmanagement controls.

12.SUPERVISORYAPPROACH

12.1.The AMCM expects each authorized institution to develop and implementeffective technology and cyber risk management systems that areconsistent with the above-mentioned principles and key processes.

12.2.While this guideline does not dictate specific means or technologies, theAMCM expects each authorized institution to implement relevantcontrols or demonstrate effective means to fulfil such controls inaccordance with its technology and cyber risk profile. An authorizedinstitution should consider the following areas when evaluating its riskprofile:

a) Technologies and connection types

11Refer to Appendix A for an example of the professional qualifications required for conducting an independentassessment of technology and cyber risk management.

b) Delivery channelsc) Online / mobile products and technology servicesd) Organizational characteristicse) Internal and external threats

12.3.If an authorized institution is a branch of an overseas incorporated bankrelying on its head / regional office to execute the roles andresponsibilities of technology and cyber risk management, it is stillexpected to demonstrate that such approach fulfils the requirements, anddoes not undermine the authorized institution’s technology and cyber riskmanagement. The authorized institution should note that, depending onthe circumstances, its governance responsibilities may still need to beexecuted by local branch management.

12.4.Prior to launching relevant services, or adopting emerging technologies,or undertaking major enhancements to its existing systems or services, anauthorized institution is expected to have in place adequate technologyand cyber risk management practices in accordance with this Guideline,or have completed relevant remediation of any major non-compliance /cybersecurity incidents.

12.5.The AMCM will, in the course of its onsite examinations and offsitereviews, determine as appropriate the adequacy of an authorizedinstitution’s technology and cyber risk management practices based onthe requirements set out in this Guideline. Authorized institution isexpected to comply with this Guideline as soon as practicable and within12 months of the date of this Guideline.

APPENDIX A: REFERENCES FOR PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Qualifications for Independent Assessment of Technology and Cyber Risk Management• ISACA CSX Fundamentals Certificate• ISACA CSX Practitioner Certificate (CSX-P)• ISACA Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)• ISACA Certified Information Security Manager (CISM)• ISACA Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC)• ISACA Certified in the Governance of Enterprise IT (CGEIT).• ISC² Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP)• EC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)Qualifications for Penetration Testing / Threat Intelligence-Based Attack Simulation• CREST Certified Simulated Attack Manager• CREST Certified Simulated Attack Specialist• CREST Certified Infrastructure Tester• CREST Certified Web Applications Tester• GIAC Penetration Tester (GPEN)• GIAC Exploit Researcher and Advanced Penetration Tester (GXPN)• Offensive Security Certified Expert (OSCE)• Offensive Security Exploitation Expert (OSEE)• Offensive Security Web Expert (OSWE)• Offensive Security Certified Professional (OSCP)• Altered Security’s Certified Red Teaming Expert (CRTE)• Altered Security’s Certified Red Teaming Professional (CRTP)• eLearnSecurity Certified Penetration Tester (eCPTX)• eLearnSecurity Web Application Penetration Tester eXtreme (eWPTX)

Threat Intelligence Specialist Qualifications• CREST Certified Threat Intelligence Manager (CCTIM)• CREST Registered Threat Intelligence Analyst (CRTIA)• GIAC Cyber Threat Intelligence (GCTI)• GIAC Penetration Tester (GPEN)• GIAC Exploit Researcher and Advanced Penetration Tester (GXPN)• HKIB's CCASP - Certified Simulated Attack Manager• McAfee Institute’s Certified Cyber Intelligence Professional (CCIP)• Offensive Security Certified Expert (OSCE)• Offensive Security Exploitation Expert (OSEE)

APPENDIX B: REFERENCES FOR INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

• Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT)o http://www.isaca.org/cobit/pages/default.aspx• SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CSC)o https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/• Information Security Forum – Standard of Good Practice for Information Securityo https://www.securityforum.org/• ISO/IEC 27001 Information security managemento https://www.iso.org• ISO/IEC 27002 Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice forinformation security controlso https://www.iso.org• ISO/IEC 27035, Information technology – Security techniques – Information securityincident managemento https://www.iso.org

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